Terri C. Hardy, widow of Bryce W. Hardy, deceased v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Terri C. Hardy, widow of Bryce W. Hardy, deceased
v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, a Utah
corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. David Eckersley, Donald R. Schow; Prince, Yeates, and Geldzahler; Attorneys for Petitioner..
George J. Romney, David J. Holdsworth; Romney and condie; Attorneys for Respondents..
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hardy v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, No. 900130.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2911
LA 'L . ,'»i iN I 
KFU 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
4&4ISO 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, widow of 
BRYCE W. HARDY, deceased, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs, 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner 
Case No. 900130 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO REVIEW A DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
George J. Romney 
David J. Holdsworth 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
M. David Eckersley 
Don R. Schow 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East Fourth South 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111 
Attorneys Fit itlone"r 
m 13w 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, widow of 
BRYCE W. HARDY, deceased, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs, 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner 
Case No. 900130 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO REVIEW A DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
George J. Romney 
David J. Holdsworth 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
M. David Eckersley 
Don R. Schow 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East Fourth South 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents Attorneys for Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
QUESTION PRESENTED 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
EACH APPLIED ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW TO THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE AND RULED 
APPROPRIATELY 2 
CONCLUSION 4 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 
787 P.2d 1 (Utah 1990) 4 
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 
669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983) * 2,3 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. . . . 2 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
The sole issue presented by this petition is whether 
this action warrants exercise of this Court's discretionary 
review authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action on an insurance policy wherein the 
plaintiff, Terri C. Hardy, was awarded judgment against 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company for $25,000.00 as a result of 
the accidental death of her husband. The sole issue presented 
in the trial court and the Court of Appeals was whether 
Mr. Hardy's death from an overdose of drugs was an accident 
within the meaning of the insurance policy in question. The 
defendant has asserted throughout the proceeding that because 
Mr. Hardy had been warned, and apparently understood, that drug 
usage would likely shorten his life, his death on the day in 
question was a natural and probable consequence of his drug use 
and, therefore, not an accident. 
The case was submitted on stipulated facts which are 
reproduced in the appendix to the petition. The decision of 
the Court of Appeals is reported at 787 P.2d 1. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
EACH APPLIED ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW TO THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE AND RULED 
APPROPRIATELY 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals noted 
that the applicable test for determining whether an event is 
accidental is that articulated by this Court in Hoffman v. Life 
Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983). Under 
that test, a death is accidental unless it was expected to 
follow from the actions of the insured with a high degree of 
certainty. Both courts hold that there was no evidence to 
suggest that Mr. Hardy expected to die as a result of his 
actions on September 10/ 1981, and that his death was therefore 
an accident within the meaning of the policy. The Court of 
Appeals also noted that the vast majority of other 
jurisdictions which have dealt with the question have ruled 
that absent affirmative evidence of suicide, death from drug 
overdose is accidental. The Court also held that because the 
language of the policy is, at best, ambiguous, it must be 
interpreted against the company in favor of coverage. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent 
with the rulings of this Court, courts of other jurisdictions, 
and settled principles of contract interpretation. This case 
presents none of the considerations set forth in Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for granting a Writ of 
Certiorari nor is there any other special or important reason 
why the matter should be reviewed by this Court. 
In this case, the defendant has acknowledged that 
there is no direct evidence that Mr. Hardy had any intent to 
take his life on September 10, 1981, or any expectation that 
his actions on that day would result in his death. As a 
substitute for such evidence, the defendant asserts the courts 
below were required to find that Mr. Hardy intended his death 
because it was the "natural and probable consequence" of his 
conduct and therefore his death "falls under the maxim that 
every many must be held to intend the natural and probable 
consequence of his deeds." Brief of Petitioner at p. 9. As 
this Court has noted, however, this maxim is not a substantive 
rule of law applicable to disputes arising under insurance 
policies. As this Court stated in Hoffman, supra., 
Although the law frequently employs the 
proposition that one intends the natural and 
probable results of his conduct in tort and 
criminal law, as well as other areas of the 
law, a rule based on that proposition is 
generally only a rule of evidence giving 
rise to an inference, not a conclusive 
presumption or a shift in the burden of 
proof. The purpose of such a rule in tort 
law is to allow an innocently injured 
plaintiff to recover against an insane 
tortfeasor. However, in accident insurance 
law, there are no plaintiffs who have 
suffered at the hands of an insane defendant. 
When an insurance company has contracted to 
cover losses from a certain risk, and the 
occurrence of that risk causes an injury 
which is insured against, liability under 
the policy cannot be avoided on the basis of 
a presumption contrary to the actual fact. 
669 P.2d at 420 (citation omitted). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the 
evidence of Mr. Hardy's history of drug use in the past 
actually gave rise to an inference that he would not expect 
drug usage to cause death. 
Hardy's own extensive experience with drug 
abuse raises the inference that he would not 
believe, with a high degree of certainty, 
that doing only what he had been doing for 
some years would cause death on 
September 10, 1981. 
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 787 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1990). 
The defendant's assertion that the courts below were 
compelled to disregard the evidence and find, instead, that 
Mr. Hardy actually intended his death is without support in the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents no special or important reason to 
warrant exercise of this Court's discretionary power of 
review. There were no disputed facts in the case and the 
courts below applied established principles of law in deciding 
the legal issue presented. Accordingly, the petition should be 
denied. 
DATED this *13*P day of April, 1990. 
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